This is a much-disputed question, usually explored abstractly and in theoretical terms. Our goal is to produce a comprehensive study of judicial behavior on federal courts. We want to know how judges vote, in different cases, and whether their votes can be predicted by features of their appointment and their background. How, for example, do Republican and Democratic appointees differ in their votes in cases involving sex discrimination, affirmative action, environmental regulation, and campaign finance? - And then after the list of hypotheses: In short, are judicial votes predictable from their ideology? Can we predict votes based on the political party of the appointing president? Are judges affected by their colleagues? Do conservative judges vote more conservatively when sitting with other conservatives? Do liberal judges become less liberal when sitting with conservative judges? We are compiling a massive database to answer these questions.

In a preliminary investigation, we found that ideology affects judicial voting in many cases. The Chicago Judges Project will substantially expand the empirical examination. In addition, the extended study will apply the findings to enduring questions in both jurisprudence and politics. It will explore how judicial behavior relates to the question of judicial neutrality, the nature of the rule of law, and the appropriate behavior of the Senate and the President in the confirmation process.

• Ideological voting
• Idological dampening
• Idological amplification